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of Empirical Research 
in International 
Investment Arbitration 
Chiara Giorgetti* 
  
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Richmond University School of Law, LLM, JSD (Yale). This paper 
builds on my commentary to Catherine Roger’s paper and presentation at The Law and Politics of 
Foreign Investment Symposium, held at Santa Clara University School of Law on February 1-2, 
2013.  I greatly benefitted from the discussions and presentations at the Symposium and I would 
like to thank all its participants. I am particularly thankful to Catherine Rogers for her excellent 
and insightful presentation, and to my co-panelist, Michael Waibel. 
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Empirical research is the new hot trend in international law.1 An increasing number 
of publications include empirical data that aim at strengthening their author’s 
argument.2 Indeed, empirical data are used to make an argument less fallible, as the 
author’s conclusions are transformed from subjective to objectively proven by the 
empirical wrap. 
Professor Catherine Rogers’ novel article, The Politics and Empirics of International 
Investment Arbitrators, highlights important limitations that empirical data may produce 
in international investment law research.3 As such, it is a needed and important 
contribution to the understanding and development of this type of scholarship, and 
generally to the study of international investment arbitration. 
The first part of my commentary evaluates the perils and benefits of empirical 
research in international investment arbitration, and concludes that – to be useful – 
empirical research must respect certain standards. In the second part, this paper 
assesses empirical research based on objective variables to conclude that it can be a 
useful tool to study and strengthen international investment arbitration, if properly 
used. 
I. Empirical Research in International Investment Arbitration 
Critics of international investment arbitration routinely affirm that international 
arbitration is plagued by irremediable weaknesses.4 They claim that the system either 
intrinsically favors the investor, or it is overwhelmed by biased arbitrators, whose 
decisions are essentially guided by personal motives.5 For these reasons, they call for 
major changes on the core attributes of international investment arbitration.6 
Of late, these criticisms have been supported by new empirical data.7 In her paper, 
Rogers assesses the state of empirical research relating to investment arbitrators and 
 
1. Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 
AM. J INT’L L. 1 (2012). 
2. Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81 
IND. L. J. 141 (2006). 
3. Catherine Rogers, The Politics of International Investment Arbitration, SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 
223 (2013). 
4. Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet, Profiting from injustice: how law firms, arbitrators and financiers 
are fueling an investment arbitration boom, CORPORATE EUROPE OBSERVATORY (Nov. 12, 2012), 
http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/profiting-from-injustice.pdf. 
5. Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1 
(2008). 
6. Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution, 25 ICSID REV. 339 (2010) 
(arguing for a change from party-appointed arbitrator to a list method or neutral-appointing 
authority). 
7. See, e.g., Gus van Harten, The (Lack of) Women Arbitrators in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 59 
COLUMBIA FDI PERSPECTIVES, (Feb. 6, 2012), 
http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/files/vale/content/FDI_Perspectives_eBook_v2_-_Nov_2012.pdf; Irene 
Ten Cate, Binders Full of Women . . . Arbitrators?, INTLAWGRRLS (Nov. 2, 2012), 
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criticizes the use of certain empirical data for this purpose.8 Importantly, she highlights 
the weakness of the data used and the methodology that produced them.9 
In the following part of this paper, I first discuss the benefits and then the perils of 
empirical research.  
A. The Importance of Empirics 
The increasing reliance on empirical data in legal scholarship focused on international 
investment arbitration is recent.10 It is especially interesting given that international 
investment arbitration itself is a relatively new field, and it signals a keen interest in the 
complexity of the subject, from both academics and practitioners. As Rogers suggests, 
“[e]mpirical data could, at least theoretically, provide a more firm basis for systematically 
evaluating the functioning of investment arbitration.”11 
Empirical research on international investment arbitration provides support for the 
proposition that arbitrators are not merely “bouchés de la loi” but carry with them their 
own experiences when making decisions.12 It, therefore, seeks to answer how these 
personal experiences help shape the results of the case.13 Importantly, it also seeks to 
examine the appropriateness of any such influence.14 
 
http://www.intlawgrrls.com/2012/11/binders-full-of-women-arbitrators.html (noting that Brigitte 
Stern was appointed 51.61% of the time and Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler 22.58%); ICSID 
Caseload Statistics Issue # 1 (2013) 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDoc
ument&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English41. 
8. Rogers, supra note 3, at 229.  
9. Id. at 232-38. 
10. See generally, Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 435 (2009), and Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About 
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2007) (demonstrating the seminal, recent work 
regarding the reliance of empirical data in international investment arbitration scholarship). 
11. Rogers, supra note 3, at 232. 
12. Montesquieu proclaimed that judges are merely the “mouth that pronounces the words of the 
law,” asserting that the judge did not create or interpret the law, but rather, it only mechanically 
applied general principles to concrete situations. 
13. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Party-Appointed Arbitrator in International Controversies: Some 
Reflections, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 59, 62 (1995); Giorgio Sacerdoti, Is the party-appointed arbitrator a 
“pernicious institution”? A reply to Professor Hans Smit, 35 COLUMBIA FDI PERSPECTIVES, 1, 2 
(Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/content/party-appointed-arbitrator-pernicious-
institution-reply-professor-hans-smit (writing that rather than being “agents”, arbitrators are 
“trustees.”). 
14. Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A Functional Approach to Developing 
Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J INT’L L. 53, 56-57 (2005) (arguing that “the mirage of absolute 
judicial impartiality becomes more distorted when it is superimposed onto the arbitrator.”); See 
also David Branson, Sympathetic Party-Appointed Arbitrators: Sophisticated Strangers and 
Governments Demand on Them, 25 ICSID REV. FOR. INV. L. J. 367, 368 (2010) (noting that party-
appointment of arbitrators is subject to “moral hazard” if “one party-appointed arbitrator sees a 
‘duty’ to act for the benefit of the appointing party and the other follows the dictates of the law and 
remains neutral, then there is imbalance, the process can be unfair and it can produce injustice.”); 
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Indeed, empirical data try to shed light onto the legitimacy crisis of international 
arbitration.15 Therefore, it serves a fundamental function of validating the decisions 
made by arbitrators.  
The problems that arise from the use of empirics in this context are discussed in the 
next section.  
B. The Innate Weakness of Empirics 
The draw to use empirical data to validate an argument is strong. However, its pitfalls 
are numerous.16 As discussed below, Rogers describes well the methodological challenges 
of empirical research. 
First, empirical data used in international investment arbitration often misses the 
most essential variable.17 Most often, empirical research relating to investment 
arbitration aims at measuring if and how extra-legal factors have contributed to the 
outcome of the decision. This research, however, is based on the assumption that it is 
somehow possible to control for the correct legal outcome.18 In other words, the research 
assumes that there is a correct answer (in the form of a judicial decision) and assumes 
that, if and when that desired outcome is not obtained, then external factors have 
entered the adjudicative equation.19  But who decides if the correct judicial decision was 
taken? The fallacy of this logic is apparent. 
Second, too often, international arbitration empirics confound a finding of correlation 
with a finding of causation.20 In other words, they perpetuate the “post hoc ergo propter 
hoc” logical fallacy. Event B is not caused by Event A only because it occurs after Event 
A. Thus, while there may be a correlation between two events, there are many factors 
that must be taken into account before causation can be established. Similarly, though 
 
See also Alexis Mourre, Are Unilateral Appointments Defensible? On Jan Paulsson’s Moral 
Hazard in International Arbitration, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Oct. 14, 2010), 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2010/10/05/are-unilateral-appointments-defensible-on-jan-
paulsson%E2%80%99s-moral-hazard-in-international-arbitration/. 
15. See, e.g., Albert Jan van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in 
Investment Arbitration, LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF 
W. MICHAEL REISMAN 821, 824 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2010); Jan Paulsson, Moral 
Hazard in International Dispute Resolution, 25 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 339 (2010); 
but see Charles N. Brower & Charles B. Rosenberg, The Death of the Two-Headed Nightingale: 
Why the Paulsson-van den Berg Presumption that Party-Appointed Arbitrators are Untrustworthy 
is Wrongheaded, 29 ARB. INT’L 7 (2013). 
16. Jason Yackee, Do States Bargain Over Investor-State Dispute Settlement? Or, Toward Greater 
Collaboration in the Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties, SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 
2013). 
17. Rogers, supra note 3, at 233.  
18. Id. at 234. 
19. Gus Van Harten, Arbitrator Behavior in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of 
Investment Arbitration, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 211 (2012).  
20. Rogers, supra note 3, at 234. 
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there may be a correlation between an event (e.g., the appointment of an arbitrator with 
a certain background) and the outcome of a particular arbitration, the proof of causation 
is an altogether different matter. 
Third, empirical data in international arbitration are often embedded by ideology and 
policy preferences.21 In fact, the researcher can predetermine the outcome of the study by 
attaching certain subjective qualities on the questions asked. Thus, questioning whether 
someone or something is “pro-investor” or “pro-State” is already attaching a value 
judgment on the issue studied. The truth may indeed just be in the eyes of the beholder.22  
Fourth, outcomes can be over-simplified.23 The translation and reading of empirical 
data is a complicated and difficult task.  This is particularly important because, as 
Rogers explains well, in international investment arbitration the content of the decisions 
is as much, if not more, important than the outcomes of which empirical research is 
based.24 
In sum, while empirical research can be a very important instrument to understand 
and reform international investment arbitration, to be useful, its limitations must be 
understood and internalized. Indeed, it is important to note that most empirical data 
used in international investment arbitration research may be faulty because they pertain 
essentially to subjective criteria. The empirical studies related to arbitration try to 
analyze the qualities of arbitrators or the possible outcomes.   
Importantly, these data can be interpreted differently, depending on who does the 
reading.25 Indeed, empirical data that try to capture personal qualities of arbitrators can 
simply be interpreted as a demonstration that arbitrators’ selection in fact works.26 They 
also demonstrate that a well-prepared party can ensure that he or she selects an 
arbitrator that has a certain predisposition to issues that are important to the appointing 
party.27  
As recently declared by an arbitral tribunal deciding – and rejecting - an arbitrator’s 
challenge 
No arbitrator and, more generally, no human being of a certain age is, in absolute 
terms, independent and impartial. Simply put, every individual is conveying ideas and 
 
21. Id. at 237. 
22. Id. at 238; See also Dan M. Kahan and Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 147 (2006).   
23. Rogers, supra note 3, at 238.  
24. Id.  
25. Id. at 237-38. 
26. C. Giorgetti, Who Decides Who Decides? Party Appointed Arbitrators In International Investment 
Arbitration And Two Ideas To Improve The System (forthcoming) (on file with the author). 
27. See Martin Hunter, Ethics of the International Arbitrator, 53 ARB. 219, 223 (1987) (stating “when I 
am representing a client in an arbitration, what I am really looking for in a party-nominated 
arbitrator is someone with the maximum predisposition towards my client, but with the minimum 
appearance of bias.”). 
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opinions based on its moral, cultural, and professional education and experience. What is 
required, when it comes to rendering judgment in a legal dispute, is the ability to 
consider and evaluate the merits of each case, without relying on facts having no relation 
to such merits.28 [note that this is quote, please apply the appropriate formatting] 
These observations do not imply that empirical research is not useful, on the contrary. 
They do imply, however, that we must pay attention to what kind of empirical research is 
useful.  The next section examines what kind of empirical research is needed; and 
namely research that test for objective, not subjective, data. 
II. What Empirical Research Is Useful? 
When we internalize Rogers’ criticism of empirical data, the issue that remains to be 
addressed is how empirical research can still be useful, and what data it should provide.  
In the remaining section of this paper, I address this question. This section demonstrates 
that empirical research can still be useful, when a question that can only have a yes/no 
answer is posited and objective criteria are evaluated. 
A. Objective Empirical Research: the example of diversity data 
Aside from possible systemic biases, a chief complaint of party-selected arbitrators is 
their limited demographic.29 Arbitrators have been typecast as “pale, male and stale.”30 
Whether arbitrators lack diversity is an assertion that can be proven empirically. 
In fact, data is available to analyze the profile of those who have been selected to sit 
on international investment tribunals, taking into consideration gender, nationality, 
professional background, legal education, and method of appointment.31 
 
28. Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Decision on Claimants' Proposal to Disqualify 
Professor Campbell McLachlan, Arbitrator, ¶ 40 (Aug 12, 2010); See also Susan Franck, The Role 
of International Arbitrators, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 499, 505-507 (2006) (noting that “Modern 
international arbitration requires the objective application of rules to facts and the exercise of 
bounded discretion to ensure that the process and final outcome is warranted. While parties may 
pick arbitrators with particular cultural and legal backgrounds and specific personal experiences, 
arbitrators also generally have an obligation to disclose those matters that would call into 
question their independence. Although all humans are inevitably influenced by the various 
experiences in their lives, in international arbitration, parties ask arbitrators to put aside biases –
and fairly and impartially exercise their independent judgment to apply their expertise to the 
facts on the record and render a decision based upon the law.”). 
29. Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT’L L. 
J. 435, 458 (2009). 
30. Susan D. Franck,  Empirically Evaluating Claims about Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C.L. 
REV. 1, 75 (2008) (citing Michael D. Goldhaber, Madame La Présidente: A Woman Who Sits As 
President of a Major Arbitral Tribunal Is a Rare Creature. Why?, AM. LAW: FOCUS EUR (2004) 
(“[A]rbitration is dominated by a few aging men, many of whom pioneered the field. In the words 
of Sarah François-Poncet of Salans, the usual suspects are ‘pale, male, and stale.’”)). 
31. See Giorgetti, supra note 26. 
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For example, in relation to geographic diversity, the most recent statistics from the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) show that 68% of all 
appointments in cases registered and administered by ICSID are from Western Europe 
and North America.32 Specifically, the appointment of arbitrators, conciliators, and ad 
hoc Committee Members appointed in cases registered under the ICSID Convention and 
the Additional Facility Rules were geographically distributed as follows: 46% from 
Western Europe; 22% from North America (Canada, Mexico and the U.S.); 11% from 
South America; 10% from South and East Asia and the Pacific; 5% from the Middle East 
and North Africa; and 2% each from Central America and the Caribbean and Sub-
Saharan Africa.33  
Conversely, only about 6% of all cases registered under the ICSID Convention and 
Additional Facility Rules include a State Party from North America or Western Europe. 
34 The data show the following geographical distribution for all ICSID cases by State 
Party involved: 1% from Western Europe; 5% from North America (Canada, Mexico and 
the U.S.); 30% from South America; 9% from South and East Asia and the Pacific; 10% 
from the Middle East and North Africa; 6% from Central America and the Caribbean; 
and 16% from Sub-Saharan Africa.35 
The data are further strengthened by an additional set of data collected by Professors 
Michael Waibel and Yanhui Wu. 36  In their data set they find that, interestingly, about 
85% of the cases are brought by an investor from a developed country against a 
developing country.37 Conversely, only about one third of the arbitrators come from 
developing countries.38 
In addition to data relating to geographical diversity, it is also possible to collect hard 
data on gender diversity. For example, data collected by Gus van Harten show that, as of 
May 2010, only 6.5% of all arbitrators appointed in investment treaty arbitration were 
women.39 He further notes that the 249 known investment treaty cases until May 2010 
generated 631 arbitral appointments.40 Only 41 of these were appointments of women -- 
 
32. These include 704 arbitrators appointed by parties and 230 appointed by ICSID.  ICSID, THE 
ICSID CASELOAD – STATISTICS (ISSUE 2013-1) 18-19 (2013), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDoc
ument&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English41 (last visited Aug. 1, 2013). 
33. Id. at 11.  
34. Id. at 18. 
35. Id. at 11.  
36. Michael Waibel & Yanhui Wu, Are Arbitrators Political?, U. OF BONN (2012), 
http://www.wipol.uni-bonn.de/lehrveranstaltungen-1/lawecon-
workshop/archive/dateien/waibelwinter11-12.   
37. Id. at 27. 
38. Id. 
39. Van Harten, supra note 7, at 1. 
40. Id. 
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just 6.5% of all appointments.41 “Worse,” he says, “of the 247 individuals appointed as 
arbitrators across all cases, only 10 were women. Women thus comprised only 4% of 
those serving as arbitrators, showing a striking lack of gender balance.”42 The percentage 
falls even more to 5.63% when considering ICSID’s more recent appointments.43 
Significantly, available data also show that 75% of all female arbitrator appointments 
went to two women.44  Without counting their appointments, the percentage of women 
arbitrators would be even lower.45 Women account for only 3.49% of appointments made 
by the Chairman of the Administrative Counsel of ICSID for all ad hoc annulment 
committee members appointed since 2008.46 
Aside from data related to diversity, other datasets can prove important for policy 
consideration in international investment arbitration.47 For example, data recording 
specific preferences by users could inform policy makers.48 In October 2012, for example, 
the School of International Arbitration at Queen Mary, University of London, and White 
& Case LLP released the results of the 2012 International Arbitration Survey: Current 
and Preferred Practices in the Arbitral Process a global survey on practices in 
international arbitration which comprised responses from more than 700 practitioners. 
The survey showed that, among other things, 76% of respondents preferred selection of 
two co-arbitrators by each party unilaterally in a three-member arbitral tribunal.49  
Hard data of diversity and data that collect the direct opinion of final users do not 
attach value judgments that can result in their subjective interpretations. As discussed 
below, they are, therefore, particularly useful guides to policy makers.  
 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. C. Mark Baker & Lucy Greenwood, Getting a Better Balance on International Arbitration 
Tribunals, 28 ARB. INT’L (2012). 
44. See Van Harten, supra note 7, at 1 (also observing that “the story is also almost entirely that 
of two women, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Brigitte Stern, who together captured 75% of 
appointments of women. In contrast, the two most frequently appointed men accounted for 5% 
of the 593 appointments of male arbitrators.”). 
45. Irene Ten Cate, Binders Full of Women . . . Arbitrators?, INTLAWGRRLS (Nov. 2, 2012), 
http://www.intlawgrrls.com/2012/11/binders-full-of-women-arbitrators.html (noting that Brigitte 
Stern was appointed 51.61% of the time and Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler 22.58%). 
46. Id. (noting “[o]ne might expect to encounter more women in annulment committees, whose 
members are appointed by the Chairman of the Administrative Counsel of ICSID. After all, 
doesn’t ICSID have greater incentives than parties to consider gender balance? Perhaps not. 
Women account for only 3.49% of annulment committee members appointed since 2008.”). 
47. C. Giorgetti, Who Decides Who Decides in International Investment Arbitration, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L 
L. (forthcoming). 
48. John Templeman, Looking behind the closed doors of international arbitration, PRACTICAL LAW 
COMPANY, Nov. 2012, http://www.whitecase.com/articles-11302012/. 
49. School of International Arbitration at Queen Mary, University of London, and White & Case LLP, 
2012 International Arbitration Survey: Current and Preferred Practices in the Arbitral Process, 
available at http://arbitration.practicallaw.com/6-522-2998. 
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B. The Usefulness of Empirics: Policy Guidance and Reform 
Data of diversity and users’ preference give support to the concern expressed in recent 
literature as to whether, given the lack of diversity that results from party-selection, the 
existing selection procedures result in the selection of the best decision makers.50 They 
also provide the overall/outside contour of the policy decision, which support party-
appointment of arbitrators. 
1. Policy Guidance: Understanding the Data 
First, this kind of data can provide useful guidance for policy makers wishing to 
assess the viability of international investment arbitration. 
It is generally accepted both at the domestic and international level that “a diverse 
judiciary is an indispensable requirement of any democracy.”51 Indeed, the need for 
geographical representation is even more important in an international dispute 
resolution setting.52 Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin of Canada argued specifically that a 
better gender balance between female and male judges would better reflect the 
composition of our society and thus more women judges would increase the legitimacy of 
the courts, reflect the commitment to equality of our society, be the best use of available 
human resources, bring new perspectives, and route out stereotypes.53  
The same can be said in support of other types of diversity. Diversity can be beneficial 
for several reasons. First, diversity brings more points of view in deliberation, so that a 
more comprehensive understanding of the parties’ positions is granted. Thus, diversity 
brings better judgments. Second, diversity enhances legitimacy because a more diverse 
tribunal better mirrors the composition of society.54 Hence, diversity also results in 
stronger judgments.55 Additionally, the lack of diversity, seen together with the increased 
 
50.  Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of 
International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 475 (2008-2009) (stating that the perceived 
shortcoming of investment arbitration – including the ad hoc appointment of arbitrators – have 
led to call for the replacement or “radical redesign of investor-state dispute-settlement 
mechanisms.”). 
51.  Lady Hale, The Appointment and Removal of Judges: Independence and Diversity Center, 
Presented at the International Association of Women Judges 8th Biennial Conference (May 3-7, 
2006), in SELECTING INTERNATIONAL JUDGES: PRINCIPLE, PROCESS AND POLITICS: DISCUSSION 
PAPER 47 (Int’l Courts & Tribunals Ser. 2010).  
52. Id. at 37. 
53. Beverly McLachlin, Why We Need Women Judges, Presented at the International Association of 
Women Judges 8th Biennial Conference (May 3-7, 2006), in THE IAWJ: TWENTY YEARS OF 
JUDGING FOR EQUALITY, 3 (Mary-Ann Hedlund et al. eds., 2010), www.iawj.org/ 
JUBILEE_BOOK_IAWJ_WEBSITE_FINAL_1_.pdf; see also Van Harten, supra note 38, at 8; see 
also Van Harten, supra note 7, at 8.  
54. McLachlin, supra note 53, at 3. 
55. See id. See also Daniel Bodansky, The Concept of Legitimacy in International Law, 194 
LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 309 (Rüdiger Wolfrum and Volker Röben eds., 2008) 
(analyzing the difficulties of defining the concept of legitimacy in international law); and Nienke 
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use of arbitration, will inevitably result in more real or perceived conflicts by selected 
arbitrators and thus in more challenges by the parties.56 Indeed, lack of diversity is also 
identified as a cause of concern by non-party stakeholders.57  
This combination of new data, intense criticism, and increased awareness and practice 
of international arbitration has resulted in a call for a reassessment and modification of 
the practice of party-appointments.58 Policy reform that can be supported by diversity 
data is examined below. 
2. Policy Reform: Ensuring Diversity 
Having established that party-appointment of arbitrators is preferred by the users of 
arbitration, the issue is then how to respond to the specific criticisms of lack of diversity – 
both geographic and gender. This criticism is recognized empirically.59 
A measure to better the arbitration system, therefore, would be to increase diversity 
by enlarging the pool of selected arbitrators. More arbitrators from outside Europe and 
North America, and more women are needed.  Diversity could be incorporated in the 
applicable legal instruments. However, amending the ICSID Convention, and amending 
UNCITRAL and PCA rules to mandate diversity, would hardly be possible.60 
Possibly, other methods could be adopted to enhance diversity. First, several actions to 
enlarge the pool of arbitrators can be taken directly by the neutral appointing authorities 
when making selection. Second, the parties can also play a role in reaching that goal. 
 i. Actions By Appointing Authorities and Secretariat 
The neutral authorities that participate in the selection of arbitrators can directly 
adopt several targeted measures to enhance diversity, and at different stages in the 
 
Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 107 
(analyzing legitimacy in international courts and tribunals involving States as litigants). 
56. Jeremy Sharpe, Introductory Note, 51 ILM 350 (2012).  
57. See Corporate Europe Observatory, PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE: HOW LAW FIRMS, ARBITRATORS 
AND FINANCIERS ARE FUELLING AN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION BOOM (Nov. 2012), 
http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/profiting-from-injustice.pdf. 
58. Jan Paulsson, Are Unilateral Appointments Defensible?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Apr. 2, 
2009), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/04/02/are-unilateral-appointments-defensible/ 
(criticizing the mechanism of appointment of arbitrators by party and suggesting possible 
alternatives, including selection by a neutral institution or the use of list for the appointment of all 
arbitrators, following the example of the Court of Arbitration for Sport); and Alexis Mourre, Are 
Unilateral Appointments Defensible? On Jan Paulsson’s Moral Hazard in International 
Arbitration, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Oct. 5, 2010), 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2010/10/05/are-unilateral-appointments-defensible-on-jan-
paulsson’s-moral-hazard-in-international-arbitration/. 
59. See supra Part II.A. 
60. Experts agree that is would be impossible to amend the ICSID Convention and to gather support 
for an amendment mandating stricter selection rules.  
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proceedings that do not require any specific mandate by Member States. Three measures 
are particularly relevant. 
First and foremost, appointing authorities should promote diversity when they select 
co- and presiding arbitrators or members of ad hoc annulment committees. Specifically, 
for example, the Administrative Council Chairman, the ICSID Secretary General and the 
PCA Secretary General can include new and diverse candidates in the lists of three 
candidates given to the parties for selection. 
Second, the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council more specifically can 
further diversity by selecting the ten members of the Panel of Arbitrators he or she has 
the right to select. In his last selection in 2012, the Chairman designated only three 
women out of ten designations.61  Though other diversity requirements were considered, 
more could be done at the institution level. 
Third, the Secretary General of ICSID could urge ICSID Contracting States to 
nominate the arbitrators in the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators with the objective of 
advancing diversity. Each Contracting State has a Convention right to nominate four 
people in the Panel of Arbitrators, who do not necessarily have to be nationals of the 
nominating State.62 Members of the Arbitrator Panels are important; the Chairman of 
the Administrative Council must select members of the panel to nominate the presiding 
arbitrators, if the parties fail to agree. Panel members are also used to nominate 
members of ad hoc annulment committees and arbitrators that the parties have failed to 
nominate. Thus, a list that contains more names of potential arbitrators will offer the 
Chairman of the Administrative Council more choice. At the moment, about a third of the 
parties to the ICSID Convention do not avail themselves of that right and nominate 
members to the List of Arbitrators.63 If more parties to the Convention nominated diverse 
arbitrators, diversity would increase substantially. For example, there could be a yearly 
reminder sent to parties urging them to make selections. 
 
61. See supra Part II.A. 
62. Under the ICSID Convention “The Centre maintains a Panel of Conciliators and a Panel of 
Arbitrators pursuant to Articles 12-16 of the ICSID Convention. Each ICSID Contracting State 
may designate up to four persons to each Panel. The designees may, but need not, be nationals of 
the designating country. In addition, up to ten persons may be designated by the Chairman of the 
ICSID Administrative Council. Each designee normally serves for a renewable term of six years.” 
See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&Pa
geType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&pageName=Announcement129.  
63. At present, 108 out of the 158 member states have made some forms of arbitrators’ selection. See 
ICSID, Members of the Panels of Conciliators and of Arbitrators, ICSID/10 at 3-5 (Jan. 2013), 
available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDoc
ument&reqFrom=ICSIDPanels&language=English. 
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 ii. Actions By Parties 
Although most of the new nominations will likely result from appointments by the 
neutral appointing authority, parties can also be urged to include diversity in their 
choice.  Many governments, which by definition are one of the parties to the dispute, 
have policies mandating diversity.64 These policies should also be used for the selection of 
arbitrators and the nomination of members of the panel of arbitrators. Further, best 
practices given to parties can provide background and reinforce the importance of 
diversity and new appointments. 
Although these measures will take time to ensure concrete results, these soft 
measures would ensure that a larger pool of arbitrators is available. Importantly, 
because they have been vetted by practice, these arbitrators will find support within the 
international arbitration practitioner circle. 
III. Conclusion 
Empirical research can provide useful data to understand international investment 
arbitration and guide its reform. It is important, however, that empirical data is used 
correctly.  
Rogers’ important article gives a valuable warning of the challenges that empirical 
research can face. She describes and assesses well the methodological pitfalls of empirical 
research and how they can influence reform proposals. 
This commentary seeks to push the discussion one step forward, and guide reform on 
the issue of diversity, based on available empirical findings.  
  
 
64. For the UK policy, for example, see Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales and Senior 
Presidents of Tribunals, Equality and Diversity Policy for the Judiciary (Oct. 2012), 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Guidance/equality_diversity.pdf.  
